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RECENT DECISIONS
Nerwal Realty Corp. v. 9th Avenue-31st Street Corp., et al., N. Y.
L. J., February 25, 1935.
A Court of Equity has power to appoint a receiver as an incident to its jurisdiction and such power is not dependent on any
statute.' The receiver has the right to collect the rent in advance,
pending the judgment by the court in the foreclosure action and the
sale which transfers ownership to the purchaser.2 The court cannot,
however, pending such transfer of ownership, terminate the rights of
the mortgagor under leases made by him or the rights of tenants to
the use and occupancy of the premises for a stipulated rental, so
long as their lessor's title has not been divested. 3
Where a tenant has paid rental in advance, as per his contract4
with the mortgagor, he cannot be compelled to pay occupational rent.
A tenant covenants for the right of quiet enjoyment,8 and upon eviction, actual or constructive, the covenant is broken.6 A wrongful
demand for rent, as in the case at bar, is such eviction,7 and where
a tenant is required to pay for use and occupation a sum beyond the
rents reserved in the lease to him, the necessary effect of an order
requiring it to pay for such use and occupation is to free it from
further obligation under its lease and constitutes a disaffirmance of
the lease.8 Therefore, the lease being terminated, the tenant was
free to negotiate a new lease with the receiver.
A. S. G.

PROCESS-DELIVERY OF SUMMONS TO SHERIFF FOR SERVICE-

SERVICE THEREOF BY INDIVIDUAL.-Plaintiff sued on a fire insurance
policy. The summons was delivered to the sheriff for service upon
defendant, pursuant to Civil Practice Act §171 within the time lim-

I Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 342 (1884) ; United States Trust Co. v.
N. Y. etc. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 478, 5 N. E. 316 (1886) ; Decker v. Gardner, 124
N. Y. 334, 26 N. E. 814 (1891).
2Keeney v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 396 (1877); Prudence Co., Inc. 4.
160 W. 73d Street, 260 N. Y. 205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932); Markantonis v.
Madlan Realty Corp., 262 N. Y. 354, 186 N. E. 862 (1933).
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
Mygatt v. Coe, 147 N. Y. 456, 62 N. E. 17 (1895).
" Scriver v. Smith, 100 N. Y. 471, 3 N. E. 675 (1885) ; Shattuck v. Lamb,
65 N. Y. 499 (1875).
Giles v. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270 (1850).
'Markantonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., supra note 2.
IN. Y. CIVI

PRAcTic AcT (1920) §17:
"An attempt to commence an action * ** is equivalent to the commencement thereof against each defendant, within the meaning of each
provision of this act which limits the time for commencing an action,
when the summons is delivered, with intent that it shall be actually
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ited by the policy.2 The sheriff held the summons, without effecting
service, for nineteen days, and after that time plaintiff caused service
to be made upon defendant by a private person. Defendant sets up
the limitation in the policy, claiming that such service did not validate
the attempt to commence the action within the meaning of Section 17.
Held, that it is immaterial what person serves the summons if delivery
is made to the sheriff with intent that he serve it. Cohoes Bronze
Co., Inc. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 243 App. Div. 224, 276 N. Y.
Supp. 619 (3d Dept. 1935).
Prior to the instant decision, the issue here decided had never
been raised. It is elementary that the meaning of the statute must
be determined by seeking the intent of its enactors.3 The avowed
purpose of Section 17 is to afford protection to a creditor, in an
emergency, against an elusive debtor, when the limited period has
nearly expired.4 The section involved herein does not define its usage
of the term "personal service." Consequently, other provisions of
the Civil Practice Act must be read to ascertain that definition. 5
Civil Practice Act §22083 provides how personal service may be made,
and distinguishing process delivered to a sheriff for service, states:
"the sheriff must serve it, and return it, with proof of service, to the
plaintiff's attorney, with reasonable diligence." 7 Does this mean that
the sheriff must be the party to serve it? 8 The Act is to be liberally
construed.9 It has been held that the arising of the bar of limitation depends upon the delivery to the sheriff, with intent that it be
served,10 and upon the fact that the action has been commenced "I
rather than the manner of making service. Thus, the court's decision is in keeping with the declared liberal spirit of the Act.12
served, to the sheriff * * *. But in order to entitle the plaintiff to the
benefit of this section, the delivery of the summons * * * must be
followed within sixty days after the expiration of the time limited ***
by personal service of the summons * * *."
2
N. Y. CIvIL PRACTICE ACT (1920) §17 applies to such a limitation. Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 327, 50 N. E. 863 (1898).
' Caddy v. Interboro Rapid Transit Co., 195 N. Y. 415, 88 N. E. 747
(1909) ; Wiley v. Solvay Process Co., 215 N. Y. 584, 588, 109 N. E. 606, 608
(1915); New York Railways Co. v. City of New York, 218 N. Y. 483, 113
N. E. 501 (1916).
' Clare v. Lockard, 122 N. Y. 263, 266, 25 N. E. 391, 391 (1890); 2
CARMODY, NEW YORK PRACTICE (1930) §465.
'New York Railways Co. v. City of New York, supra note 3; Rees v.
Teachers Retirement Board, 247 N. Y. 372, 160 N. E. 644 (1928); In re
Davison's Estate, 137 Misc. 852, 857, 244 N. Y. Supp. 616, 622 (1930).
IN. Y. CivIL PRACTICE ACT (1920) §220.
Italics are writer's.
"See 2 CARMODY, Op. Cit. supra note 4, §633, n. 25, for the view that such
is the construction that apparently must be given.
'Continental Ins. Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., 137 Misc. 28, 244 N. Y. Supp.
377 (1930), aff'd, 229 App. Div. 657, 243 Supp. 200 (1st Dept. 1930).
Riley v. Riley, 141 N. Y. 409, 411, 36 N. E. 398, 399 (1894).
U Clare v. Lockard, supra note 4.
Supra note 9.

RECENT DECISIONS
But this construction gives a special meaning to Section 220
which disregards the distinction there made between service in general and service by a sheriff when process is delivered to him for
that purpose. Such interpretation should not be made unless the intent of the legislature clearly points to that construction.1 3 Generalization by the court of the meaning of "personal service" under Section 1714 does not seem warranted, 5 nor does their disregard of the
evident distinction found in Section 220.

J. T. B.,

JR.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER IN COMMON LAW AcTIoN FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A DIsEAsE NOT
ENUMERATED IN THE STATUTE.-His

claim having been dismissed

by the State Industrial Board; plaintiff brought this action at law.
He alleged that he was an employee of the defendant and that in the
course of his employment in defendant's factory he inhaled dust and
other impurities which caused him to contract silicosis. The defendant is charged with failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of duties imposed by statute and common law. 1 The
disease from which the plaintiff is suffering is not an "occupational
disease" for which the statute imposes a liability on the employer
to provide compensation. 2 The defendant, having complied with
the Workmen's Compensation Law in all respects, moved to dismiss
the complaint under rules 106 and 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice. This was denied and on appeal held, affirmed. In cases not
covered by the statute, the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol.
Laws, ch. 67) does not bar an action at law by the employee against
the employer to recover damages sustained through his contracting
an occupational disease not enumerated in the statute, by reason of
the alleged negligence of the employer. Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw
Co., Inc., 266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934).
a People v. Long Island R. Co., 194 N. Y. 130, 87 N. E. 79 (1909).
"Supra note 1.
People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137, 150, 15 N. E. 371, 376 (1888) ; Pardy
v. Boomhower Grocery Co., 178 App. Div. 347, 164 N. Y. Supp. 775, 777 (3d
Dept. 1917) ; In re Kassam's Estate, 141 Misc. 366, 252 N. Y. Supp. 706 (1931),
aff'd without opinion, 235 App. Div. 609, 255 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1st Dept. 1931).
'Flike v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549 (1873) ; Daurizio v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 152 Misc. 716, 274 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1934).
IN. Y. WORKMEN'S COmPENSATioN LAw (1922) §3, subd. 2, and §§11,
38, 48; see 73 A. L. R. 543, citing Williams v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds,
18 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 535 (1925) for the proposition that silicosis is not an
accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment but
is an industrial disease. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to set forth
facts showing that the statute does not apply. Nulle v. Hardman, 185 App.
Div. 351, 173 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1st Dept. 1918).

